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ABSTRACT 
Even before Iraq the growing use of private military contractors has been widely discussed in the 
academic and public literature. However, the reasons for this proliferation of private military 
companies and its implications are frequently generalized due to a lack of suitable theoretical 
approaches for the analysis of private means of violence in contemporary security. As a consequence, 
this article contends, the analysis of the growth of the private military industry typically conflates two 
separate developments: the failure of some developing states to provide for their national security and 
the privatisation of military services in industrialized nations in Europe and North America. This 
article focuses on the latter and argues that the concept of security governance can be used as a 
theoretical framework for understanding the distinct development, problems and solutions for the 
governance of the private military industry in developed countries. 
  
 
Introduction 
 
As the recent intervention in Iraq has highlighted the increasing role of private military firms in 
international security, the proliferation of the “new mercenaries” (Adams, 1999) has been widely 
criticised. However, when offering an assessment of the private military industry, many authors have 
tended to conflate the rise of the industry in Europe and [end of p.247] North America with that in the 
Third World (e.g. Singer, 2003; Nossal, 2001). As a consequence these studies frequently generalize 
the controversial involvement of now-disbanded companies such as Executive Outcomes and 
Sandline International in regional conflicts such as in Angola and Sierra Leone, while the primary 
growth of the private security industry has been in Europe and North America where governments 
have pursued the outsourcing of military services since the mid-1990s (Krahmann, 2005b). By 2002 
the United Kingdom thus had outsourced military services in excess of £1.4 billion and was 
considering more than ninety new projects with an estimated value of £6 billion ranging from the 
training of Royal Air Force pilots and Navy personnel to the provision of spare parts and logistics 
(MoD, 2004a). Similarly, the United States (U.S.) has progressively expanded its employment of 
private military contractors for military and military support services since the 1990s (Markusen, 
2003: 474-477). Moreover, in addition to the outsourcing of national security, countries in Europe and 
North America are increasingly using private companies in international interventions such as in the 
former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq (Isenberg, 2004; Spearin 2003). In fact, the number of 
private military contractors employed in overseas operations has increased from in the region of 1:100 
in the first Gulf War to 1:10 in the current operation in Iraq (Spearin, 2003: 28). 
 Contending that the outsourcing of military services by governments in Europe and North 
America needs to be distinguished from the use of mercenary firms in the developing world, this 
article aims to provide a theoretically guided analysis and explanation of the origins, problems and 
potential means of governance of military outsourcing in the transatlantic regions. It justifies its focus 
on Europe and North America with three arguments. First, most of the revenue of private military 
companies stems from services provided to governments and private actors in the transatlantic region. 
Moreover, industrialized nations appear to be the primary growth area for the private military industry 
as these firms are increasingly viewed as legitimate actors in European and North American security 
(Lilly, 2000: 7). 
  Second, the outsourcing of security services within the transatlantic community differs in 
many respects from the use of private military firms in the Third World where it has been associated 
with weak or „failed‟ states (Aning, 2001; Holmqvist, 2005: 11-17). This article proposes that the 
privatisation of security in Europe and North America, unlike that in developing countries, can be 
understood as part of the emergence of a new system of „security governance‟ in the post-Cold War 
era. The concept of security governance explains the transformation of transatlantic security policy 
from [end of p.248] the state-centred bias and bipolar structure of the Cold War towards a complex 
system of functionally differentiated networks which involve both public and private security 
providers. 
 Third, the development, problems and options for the regulation of these firms in Europe and 
North America are crucial for defining the international role of private military companies. Since most 
of these companies are based in industrialized countries, they can be, even when contracted by Third-
World actors, subject to the legal and normative restraints imposed by Western governments. 
Moreover, due to the large role of European and North American governments in the provision of 
security and development aid to Third World countries, Western governments are able to influence 
how private military companies may be used in local operations. Finally, European and North 
American governments determine which companies are considered for contracts in international 
peacekeeping missions or by international organizations in which they are members. 
 In the following, this article is structured in three parts. The first part examines how the 
concept of security governance can help to understand the growing use of private military contractors 
by governments in Europe and North America. The second part discusses its contribution to 
understanding the specific problems which have been linked to the outsourcing of military functions 
to private companies in the transatlantic region. And the third part, investigates how to the concept of 
security governance can help to identify suitable mechanisms for addressing these problems. 
 
 
Security Governance and the Proliferation of Private Military Companies 
 
While the use of private military companies in the Third World has been controversial but limited, the 
employment of private military companies by governments in Europe and North America has grown 
exponentially since the 1990s. Three main explanatory factors have been proposed in the academic 
literature for the accelerated growth of these companies over the past two decades. The first factor is 
the increased demand generated by the outbreak of small conflicts in the Third World where fragile 
regimes can no longer count on the financial and military support of one of the two superpowers 
(Brooks, 2000: 132; Singer, 2003: 55). The second factor is a decreased willingness of European and 
North American governments to engage in international peacekeeping [end of p.249] operations 
unless their immediate security interests are concerned, following the failure of missions such as in 
Somalia in the early 1990s (Brooks, 2000: 134; Taulbee, 2000:434f.; Cleaver, 2000: 137; Singer, 
2003: 58). The third factor is the reduction of defence budgets and the rising cost of military 
technology and operations in particular after the end of the Cold War (Arnold, 1999: 173; Singer, 
2003: 67; Spearin, 2003: 28). 
 This article suggests that the above explanations for the growth of the private military 
industry subsume two analytically distinct developments. The first factor refers to the lack of credible 
military forces, which is often linked to the notion of failed statehood in the Third World. The latter 
two factors can be explained by the emergence of a system of „security governance‟ in Europe and 
North America where states continue to uphold substantial and sophisticated military forces, but 
choose to subcontract part of their national or international security functions to private companies. 
 This trend from „government‟ to „security governance‟ in European and North America is 
characterized by the fragmentation of security policy making in seven key dimensions: geography, 
function, distribution of resources, interests, norms, decision-making and policy implementation 
(Krahmann, 2003a). Each dimension can take a variety of forms along a scale between the ideal 
notions of „government‟ and „security governance‟ as defined in Table 1.1  
 
  
Obviously, it is difficult to specify which or how many dimensions have to be fragmented for a policy 
making structure to qualify as „governance‟ rather than „government‟.2 Most contemporary security 
policy making arrangements would be placed somewhere between these two ideal types. 
Moreover, security arrangements in North America and Europe are constantly evolving, 
although not all dimensions shift at the same speed. Thus it appears that changes in some dimensions 
are promoting those in others in order to achieve internally consistent systems which are suggested by 
the ideal types of „government‟ and „security governance‟. Combined with the transformation of the 
international security environment, these changes can serve as explanatory variables for the 
progressive shift from „government‟ to „security governance‟ (Krahmann, 2005a: 27-28). Specifically, 
it can be argued that the replacement of interstate war as the most important source of insecurity in 
Europe and North America by military, political, social, economic and environmental threats, such as 
terrorism, proliferation and civil conflicts, is challenging the ability of sovereign nation-states to 
ensure the security of their citizens. As a consequence, states within the transatlantic region 
progressively recognize the resources and expertise of non-state actors such as [end of p.250] 
international organizations which can help to improve their national and international security. This 
shift is supported by a change in the norms underlying public policy making which consider 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness in security policy making as more important than state sovereignty 
and the maintenance of the state monopoly on the legitimate use of force. In short, changes in three 
dimensions appear to be promoting the transformation from „government‟ to „security governance‟: 
functional fragmentation due to the rise of non-state security threats, resource fragmentation due to 
the diversity of skills and capabilities required in dealing with these threats, and normative changes 
from ideology and state sovereignty to cost-efficiency. 
 
Table 1. „Government‟ and „Security Governance‟ as Ideal Types 
DIMENSIONS 
Government  
 
Security Governance  
 
Geographical scope 
state 
regional 
subnational  
state 
regional 
global 
Functional scope 
Military military 
political 
social 
environmental 
Distribution of 
resources 
centralised in states and NATO/ WTO fragmented among public and private 
actors at different levels: firms, 
charities, NGOs, states, UN, NATO, EU, 
OSCE ... 
Interests Common Differentiated 
Norms 
sovereignty 
‘one for all, all for one’ 
ideological priorities 
limited sovereignty 
‘coalitions of the willing’ 
cost-efficiency 
Decision-making 
centralised 
consensus 
formal equality 
fragmented 
negotiation 
inequality 
Implementation 
centralised 
authoritative 
fragmented 
voluntary 
 
  
For the emergence of „security governance‟, several hypotheses follow which suggest that changes in 
the other dimensions can be linked to these transformations. First, the diversification of security 
threats and the differentiation of resources [end of p.251] and capabilities among state and non-state 
actors suggests the growing geographical fragmentation of security policy making among multiple 
and diverse sets of actors at the subnational, national, regional and global levels. Second, because of 
the non-state nature of the new security challenges we are likely to observe the differentiation of 
security interests and, due to the decreased threat from interstate war cooperation, can proceed within 
more flexible coalitions of the willing which are more suited to accommodate the complex and 
regionally differentiated impact and interests related to non-state security threats. Third, the 
complexity of the new threats, the weakening of the state monopoly on the provision of security and 
the rise of cost-efficiency as legitimising mechanism promote changes in the making and 
implementation of security policy making. In particular, they will encourage functional specialization 
and differentiation among state and non-state actors, and lead to fragmented and voluntary decision-
making and implementation arrangements which typically rely on negotiated forms of cooperation 
among multiple actors, such as contracts. 
 In security, these changes appear to have well progressed towards „security governance‟ 
through the broadening of the notion of security from military to non-military threats and in terms of 
resource fragmentation. However, in the other dimensions there appears to be a slower development. 
The problems which arise from this for the internal logic and functioning of these security 
arrangements and their consequences will be discussed in more detail in the second part of this article. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that in the area of national and international security a transformation 
from „government‟ to „security governance‟ can be detected since the end of the Cold War 
(Krahmann, 2003a). The following examines how the proliferation of private military companies in 
Europe and North America can be explained by this transformation. 
 The perceived increase in „new‟ security threats, such as ethnic war, international terrorism 
and transnational crime, has been one of the key factors promoting the growing role of private 
security providers as it created new demand for security services. Importantly, in Europe and North 
America this demand could only in part be met by existing national armed forces that had just been 
cut back after the end of the Cold War due to public calls for a peace dividend (Spearin, 2003: 28; 
Carver, 1992: 155; Croft and Dunn, 1990). Following the widespread reduction of armed forces and 
military support units in Europe and North America, these states were unprepared for the new threats 
and more interventionist approaches to national and international security which were adopted after 
the break-up of Yugoslavia and 11 September 2001. As a consequence, governments have been 
induced to turn to private military companies, which could be called upon on short notice, to 
supplement their forces.[end of p.252] 
The second crucial factor contributing to the emergence of a private military industry in 
Europe and North America has been the fragmentation of military resources and capabilities between 
public and private actors. In addition to Cold War-related reductions in defence spending, defence 
budgets have become strained due to the rising costs of standing armies, professional training, and 
armaments research and development (Greenwood, 1991; Smith, 1993; Spearin, 2003; 29-30). Many 
Western governments increasingly rely on public-private partnerships with private defence 
corporations in order to fund new defence investments and military technologies (Gates and Robbert, 
1998; Pint and Hart, 2001; Krahmann, 2005b).  
This shift from the centralization of resources through taxation and government spending in 
national and international security to a fragmented mode is represented by shift to Private Finance 
Initiatives (PFIs) as „first choice method of funding new capital projects‟ by the British Ministry of 
Defence (MoD, 2004a)
3
. In these schemes private companies to bid for not only for the servicing, but 
also the construction and maintenance of military facilities. The investment into the building of such 
facilities is financed by the private sector in return for military service contracts which typically last 
between ten and forty years and guarantee continuous income in the form of agreed fees. In addition, 
some PFIs allow companies to generate „third party revenue‟ from the sale of spare capacities to 
private customers. Although the cumulative cost for the provision of these facilities will tend to be 
  
higher than if they had been financed by the government, Western industrialised countries 
increasingly prefer PFIs because they spread the cost of a military project more evenly over the 
duration of the contract. This eliminates the difficulties of having to secure parliamentary approval for 
projects with huge start-up costs in a particular budget year. However, since the facilities are funded 
by the private sector, they remain in private hands and thus further contribute to the fragmentation of 
military resources among public and private actors.  
The third critical transformation has been in the weakening of ideology and national 
sovereignty as central norms in national and international security policy making in favour of 
economy and cost-efficiency (Spearin, 2003: 29). In contemporary Europe and North America, the 
high defence spending which contributed to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and placed significant 
burdens on Western industrialized nations is no longer acceptable. Instead governments and the 
electorate are calling for „value for money‟ in defence spending (Howe, 1998; Brooks, 2000: 131; 
Markusen, 2003: 477-8).[end of p.253] 
Moreover, in an attempt to further increase efficiency, governments are allowing private 
companies to take over functions which until recently were regarded as the monopoly of the state. In 
Europe this has led not only to the progressive privatisation of national defence industries, but also to 
the acceptance of transnational mergers in the armaments and military service sectors. While during 
the Cold War, an independent national deterrent was closely linked to the raison d’être of states like 
the United Kingdom and France, the 1990s have seen the transnational integration of the defence 
sector across Europe and North America (Bitzinger, 1994; Skoens and Wulf, 1994). Today large 
transnational defence corporations and private military companies are increasingly dominating the 
international market with firms such as Lockheed Martin, BAE Systems, EADS and Thales providing 
not only the goods but, through subsidiaries, frequently also the associated military services such as 
training and maintenance. 
 One of the results of these changes is the progressive geographical fragmentation of security 
policy making. In the post-Cold War era, this development has resulted in two trends: an „upward‟ 
shift towards regional and global institutions of governance and a „sideways‟ shift towards private 
security providers. The upward trend has been identified with the geographical expansion of NATO 
and the EU as well as a growing number of regional and sub-regional institutions (Cottey, 2000). The 
„sideways‟ trend has ranged from the privatisation of the armaments industry (Lovering, 1998; James, 
2000) to the outsourcing of military services such as logistics, transport and training to private 
military companies in Europe and North America (Matthews and Parker, 1999; Mandel, 2002; 
Krahmann, 2005b). 
 Crucially the use of private military companies within a geographically fragmented security 
architecture not only offers the prospect of decreased spending on military services, but also enables 
European and North American governments to intervene globally with greater flexibility. In 
particular, the use or tacit approval of private military companies operating in international conflicts 
or post-conflict reconstruction allows Western democratic governments to circumvent public 
opposition against foreign interventions. Most recently, the governments of the United Kingdom and 
the United States have been accused of having withheld prior intelligence about the intended 
mercenary coup in Equatorial Guinea which was funded by British and South African backers 
including Sir Mark Thatcher, the son of former UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (Observer, 
24/11/04; Guardian 27/9/04). In addition, the United States has licensed a contract between the 
Virginia-based private military company Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI) and the Croat 
[end of p.254] government for the training of the newly formed Croat armed forces which is alleged 
to have contributed to the expulsion ethnic Serbs from the Krajina region. Finally, the British Foreign 
Office has been accused of having implicitly approved the involvement of London-based Sandline 
International in Sierra Leone (Sunday Times 3/5/98; Times 4/5/98; Cleaver, 2000: 142-43). 
 A further consequence is the differentiation of security functions among state and non-state 
security providers. In particular, the growing emphasis on non-traditional areas of security combined 
with the limited expertise, the reduction in military personnel and the resources of governments in 
these areas has strengthened the role of private actors in security governance. The provision of 
humanitarian aid in complex emergencies such as the former Yugoslavia, for instance, relied on a 
 multitude of national and international non-governmental organizations for the provision of basic 
security needs such as shelter, food, water and health care. In addition, defence ministries in Europe 
and North America seek to exploit the expertise of private companies through the outsourcing of 
support functions, including base maintenance, estate management and logistics. In the military 
sector, thus, a division of labour appears to emerge between combat, which so far remains the 
exclusive domain of national armed forces in Western democracies, and non-combat functions, which 
are progressively delegated to the private sector. 
 In addition to changes in structure of security provision, the shift from „government‟ to 
„security governance‟ is fostering a transformation in how security interests are perceived in the Cold 
War era, which helps to explain the increasing role of private military companies in the transatlantic 
community. Specifically, there has been a growing willingness to recognize the diverse security 
interests of states in Europe and North America with regard to different types of threats ranging from 
ethnic conflicts to terrorism and transnational crime. The creation of an independent European 
Common Security and Defence Policy stands for the European aim to provide for its own security and 
create the necessary capabilities. NATO, too, has progressed toward a more flexible structure with the 
development of the Combined Joint Task Forces which allows the formation of “coalitions of the 
willing”.  
 This trend towards a differentiation of interests directly contributes to the growing demand for 
private military companies because they allow American and European governments to act more 
independently in their provision of national and international security (Spearin, 2003: 35). While 
during the Cold War Europe frequently depended upon the United States and the Atlantic Alliance for 
military support such as transport or logistics [end of p.255], private military companies are now 
offering these services on the international market. Until the expected completion of the Future Large 
Transport Aircraft in 2009, the United Kingdom is thus relying on private airlift capacity such as 
Antonov planes which have been used during the international intervention in Kosovo (NAO, 2000: 
34; Airbus, 2005). Other contracts for the private provision of military transport capabilities include 
the six Roll-on Roll-off Ferries of the British Armed Forces which are chartered on a permanent or ad 
hoc basis under a PFI scheme running until 2024 (MoD, 2003). 
 Finally, these changes are facilitating the transformation of security policy decision-making 
and implementation in Europe and North America. While traditionally government and, especially, 
the military have heavily relied on hierarchical structures, the introduction of new public management 
principles in order to increase cost-efficiency and the growing reliance on the capabilities of private 
security companies have encouraged the establishment of more horizontal relationships in the defence 
sector. Through public private partnerships and private finance, these arrangements move away from 
decision-making and implementation structures in which the government directed private service 
suppliers to cooperative relations in which private firms are involved as partners in defining policies 
and their implementation (MoD, 2004b). 
 Moreover, due to the above developments, the implementation of security policies in Europe 
and North America is becoming more and more fragmented and allows for a greater role of private 
military companies. Although most security policy decisions are still taken in the final instance by 
national governments and international organizations, private companies not only implement these 
policies at the national level, but also, increasingly, abroad. Moreover, the partnership arrangements 
between public and private actors give private military companies more freedom in the way they 
implement security policies. In fact, the idea of public private partnerships is based on the assumption 
that private companies will be able to operate the more cost-efficiently the less they are impeded by 
governmental or contractual direction. This collaborative spirit, however, presumes that private 
military companies will voluntarily operate in the best interest of the government and will not exploit 
their freedom to increase profits. 
 The preceding analysis has suggested that the proliferation of private military companies in 
Europe and North America can be explained by the shift from „government‟ to „security governance‟. 
As has been suggested, the degree of this shift can vary considerably across different dimensions. 
Whereas it seems to have progressed most in the geographical and functional fragmentation of 
security policy making, other [end of p.256] dimensions such as decision-making and implementation 
  
are still in the process of adapting to new modes of governance. The following section examines how 
these differences can lead to governance failure. 
 
 
Private Military Companies and Governance Failure 
 
While the growing use of private military companies helps to lower the pressures on the resources of 
governments and international organisations, it has also been linked to a range of governance failures 
(Isenberg, 2004: 39-49; Taulbee 2000: 436; Zarate 1998: 77). This section suggests that the shift from 
government to security governance can help to understand why. It proposes that governance failures 
arise when the transformation from a system of centralized „government‟ to a fragmented system of 
„security governance‟ in some of the identified seven dimensions is not matched by congruent 
changes in the other dimensions. The results are internal inconsistencies which can lead to normative 
and practical tensions. Normative failures specifically arise when changes in the policy process are 
not consistent with prevailing norms and beliefs. Whereas practical governance failures emerge from 
mismatches across the non-ideational dimensions of „government‟ and „governance‟ as ideal types, 
such as geographical and functional scope, resource distribution, and policy making and 
implementation. The following discusses three sets of governance failures in detail: lack of 
transparency and accountability, loss of control, and decreased efficiency. 
 
Transparency and accountability 
 
Lack of transparency and public accountability are among the most frequently noted problems in the 
governance of private military companies (Singer, 2003: 152-4; Holmqvist, 2005: 28-9; Grant 1998; 
Howe 1998; Silverstein 1997; Lovering 1998: 233; Edmonds: 1999:126). Both are essentially 
normative concerns and can be explained by the observation that the fragmentation of functions and 
resources among public and private security providers clashes with persistent norms concerning 
responsible „government‟ and democratic decision-making processes which have been developed in 
Europe and North America during the Cold-War era. 
 One way in which the emergence of security governance is challenging established norms and 
decision-making arrangements is the dissolution of clear lines of responsibility. [end of p.257] While 
under „government‟ political responsibility rests with the legislative and executive, in „governance‟ it 
is distributed among a multiplicity of public and private actors (Krahmann, 2003b). Since these actors 
cooperate in the making and implementation of security policies, no single actor can be held 
accountable for the outcomes of this process. In Iraq, for instance, public accountability and oversight 
has been made more difficult not only by the employment of a large number of private military firms 
for services ranging from the provision of military logistics and training to the interrogation of 
detainees in the infamous Abu Ghraib prison, but also because these firms frequently use national and 
local subcontractors (Isenberg, 2004: 69-71; Spearin, 2003: 39-40).  
 Moreover, governments and private military companies are accountable to different actors. 
While governments are answerable to the electorate, private military companies are responsible to 
their shareholders and customers (Edmonds 1999: 126; Markusen, 2003: 488). Only the former is 
accountable to the general public and hence under the scrutiny of parliamentary inquiries and the 
media. Although private armaments and security companies make some data available to 
shareholders, detailed information on where armaments and services are sold and for what purpose are 
not published for a broader audience (Markusen 2003: 6). Even when governments employ private 
military companies, the details of these contracts are rarely made public. Moreover, while there has 
been increasing demand for the publication of data on national arms exports, the military service 
industry has so far avoided calls for greater transparency. 
 It can thus be argued that the perceived loss of transparency and accountability due to the 
outsourcing of security functions to private military companies is a consequence of norms that have 
 been developed and, so far, enforced within the context of centralized structures of „government‟ 
which are unsuited to the emerging system of „governance‟.  
 
Governmental Control 
The loss of governmental control over security policy is the second normative problem which can be 
explained by the shift from „government‟ to „security governance‟ (Grant 1998: 2; Howe 1998; Zarate 
1998: 146). Specifically, the progressive privatisation and internationalisation of the security industry 
and the consequent fragmentation of security policy making in terms of geography, function and 
distribution of resources contributes to the reduction of immediate governmental control over national 
and international security. However, while the fragmentation political authority among multiple actors 
is not [end of p.258] synonymous with governance failure in policy sectors such as education or the 
environment, it is perceived as a problem in security because the loss of governmental control 
contradicts persistent popular beliefs in European and North American according to which the state 
should have the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and be sovereign in its provision of 
national security. Additional problems arise from the fact that the interests of profit-oriented private 
security companies are not necessarily congruent with those of a government or the general public 
(Markusen, 2003: 473). 
 The loss of governmental control over security governance primarily appears to be due to two 
developments. The first development is the ability of private security firms to evade national controls. 
The second is the changing balance of power between the state and private security companies. The 
internationalisation of the private military industry has contributed to both. In particular, it has 
enabled private military companies to exploit weak controls over the private military service industry. 
The absence of strict and comprehensive national and international regulation is due to the relatively 
recent and exponential growth of private military companies which began in the 1990s. Governments 
and international organisations in Europe have only been catching up with this development in the last 
few years (Krahmann, 2005b; Krahmann, 2005c), while the United States has required licences for the 
export of private military services for some time (Nossal 2001: 465; Taulbee 2000: 440; Zarate 1998: 
138). 
 In addition, the ability of Western governments to control the private military sector has been 
reduced by changes in the relative power of public and private actors (Singer, 2003: 187). With the 
outsourcing of military functions to private military companies, governments in Europe and North 
America are becoming more dependent upon private actors for the provision of security. The expertise 
and information advantage of private military companies and the simultaneous erosion of relevant 
expertise among public agencies as the consequence of persistent outsourcing allow private firms to 
influence governmental security policies (Markusen, 2003: 484; Spearin, 2003: 37). Today, private 
military corporations are as much involved in the definition of security threats and policies as in their 
implementation (Spearin, 2003: 35). Moreover, flexible modern contracts based on „indefinite-
delivery and indefinite-quantity‟ and „cost-plus award fee‟ principles grant private security actors 
more freedom in how they implement security tasks identified by the government (GAO 2000). 
Finally, the consolidation of the military equipment and service sectors into a decreasing 
number of large corporations, such MPRI-L-3 Communications (acquired 2000), Vinnell-[end of 
p.259]Northrop Gumman (2002), DynCorp-CSC (2003) and Group 4-Securior (2004), is reducing the 
ability of governments to choose between competing private security providers (SIPRI, 2005; 
Markusen, 2003; 478). Thus, even where governments are dissatisfied with the provision of services, 
they may have little choice but to continue contracts as not to endanger ongoing operations (Spearin, 
2003: 37). A recent example for this dilemma has thus resulted in the decision of the US government 
not to suspend payments to Kellogg, Brown and Root for overcharging for food provided to troops in 
Iraq because KBR suggested that this might cause the „interruption of crucial support services to the 
U.S. military‟ (NYT, 3/2/05). 
 
Lack of Efficiency 
  
Another governance failure which has been noted in Europe and North America is lack of cost 
efficiency in the making and implementation of security policies. In particular, Kellogg, Brown and 
Root has repeatedly been accused of overcharging the US armed forces for services provided under its 
LOGCAP contract in Iraq. Thus, the US Defense Contract Audit Agency found evidence that the 
company overbilled the government by $108 million for fuel imports (NYT, 15/3/05). In addition, 
auditors have accused KBR of excess charging the armed forces $160 million for meals in base camps 
all over Iraq (GAO, 2004: 26-7; NYT 25/11/04a). Altogether it is estimated that KBR has 
overcharged the US government by estimated $2 billion for contract work in Iraq valued at $10 billion 
(NYT, 25/11/04b). 
Already in the former Yugoslavia, KBR had been criticised by the US Government 
Accounting Office (GAO) for exploiting the flexibility of its indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity 
contract for support services to US operations in the region in order to increase its profits (GAO, 
2000). Examples included the installing of a 100 per cent electricity backup for US military bases in 
Kosovo, although only a few key functions such as the military hospital needed such backups. Other 
cases of over-provision included the bases‟ fire fighting services and the cleaning of military quarters 
for which KBR set much higher standards than those used by the military itself. 
 That cost-efficiency can be a problem in security governance is especially interesting because 
the main argument for the shift from public to private service providers is the belief that private 
companies can offer services at better value for money than governmental agencies. However, if 
viewed within the context of the shift from [end of p.260] „government‟ to „security governance‟, it is 
little surprising. In particular, these inefficiencies can be attributed to the mismatch between changes 
in security policy making in terms of geography, function, resource distribution and interests on the 
one hand, and traditional governmental decision-making and implementation arrangements on the 
other. In particular, it can be argued that these decision-making and implementation structures will 
have to be adjusted to governance mechanisms because the structure, interests and actions of private 
military companies are not necessarily congruent with the policy imperatives of the governments that 
employ them or the states in which they are based. Such governance mechanisms include the 
development of oversight and control measures appropriate for dealing with fragmented and 
marketized service provision (Markusen, 2003: 493; GAO, 2004). 
 While the shift from „government‟ to „governance‟ appears to be the cause of some problems 
in the provision of national and international security since the end of the Cold War, it can be argued 
that new modes of governance can also help to address these problems. The next section discusses the 
utility of three types of governance mechanisms in particular: self-regulation, contracts, and national 
and international legislation. 
 
 
New Modes of Governance 
 
Due to their focus on mercenaries and private military companies in weak or failing states in the Third 
World, many analyses have been very sceptic about the possibility of addressing the problems 
associated with the growth of the private military sector. This section suggests that governance 
failures within the private military sectors in Europe and North America cannot only be explained by 
the shift from „government‟ to „governance‟, but that these ideal types can also help to indicate how 
the private security sector in industrialised countries might be governed. Specifically, these means 
need to resolve the tensions inherent in the shift from „government‟ to „governance‟. Theoretically 
there appear to be three options to achieve this. The first option would be to return those dimensions 
which have progressed most towards „governance‟ to more centralized forms of security policy 
making. The second option would be to develop new mechanisms to overcome the differences 
between the dimensions without changing their modes of policy making. The third option would be to 
endorse „governance‟ principles in all dimensions. This section will focus on three mechanisms in 
particular: self-regulation, contractual obligation and regulation. [end of p.261] 
 Each of these mechanisms appears to embody to different degrees the three theoretical 
options for dealing with governance failures which have been outlined above. Self-regulation and 
contracts can be understood as strengthening fragmented „governance‟ as the overriding principle of 
policy making. Whereas increased governmental and intergovernmental regulation of private military 
services can be viewed as an attempt to return control to centralized „government‟. Examining each 
mechanism in turn, this section discusses the effectiveness of these policies. 
 
Self-regulation 
Self-regulation typically refers to a number of mechanisms which can either be used unilaterally or in 
combinations. They include the licensing of individuals and companies, the setting of training 
requirements, the establishment of minimum standards of security and insurance, as well as 
managerial, ethical and operative guidelines. By establishing these standards, self-regulation cannot 
only increase the transparency and accountability of contractors, but also their cost-efficiency.  
In the private military sector, first attempts at self-regulation have been made by the 
International Peace Operations Association which has designed a voluntary „Code of Conduct‟ to 
which major companies such as ArmorGroup, MPRI and Blackwater have signed up (IPOA, 2005). 
Other companies have drawn up their own ethics codes, such as Control Risk Group (CRG, 2005), or 
established company-wide training standards and courses. Additional standards can be found among 
national security sector organizations such as the British Security Industry Association which requires 
for ISO 9001 certification and has established standards of proper conduct to which member 
companies must subscribe (BSIA, 2005). 
In spite of these efforts, self-regulation of the private military and security industry has so far 
been limited. On the one hand, few companies have signed up to voluntary national or international 
standards, on the other hand, many standards lack convincing monitoring or enforcement structures. 
Moreover, while a license by an industry association can improve the public credibility of a private 
military or security company, it is not legally required. Customers may prefer cheaper, non-licensed 
firms. Finally, transnational companies can evade the controls established by national associations 
through registering or working abroad. [end of p.262] 
In addition to the lack of and problems affecting the self-regulation of the private military 
industry in practice, the theoretical framework proposed in this article suggests that t the ability of 
self-regulation to address normative governance failures, such as lack of transparency, accountability 
and control, is already in theory limited. Even if self-regulation were effective, it will be considered 
insufficient as long as popular norms demand that elected governments are accountable and in control 
of the provision of national and international security rather than private companies. It follows that for 
self-regulation to be able to address the perceived lack of transparency, accountability, control and 
efficiency in the private military sector, there will have to be a normative change from „government‟ 
to „governance‟ in security. 
 
Contracts 
In addition to self-regulation, contracts have been proposed as another mechanism for improving the 
transparency, accountability, control and cost-efficiency of the security industry. Contracts can place 
similar requirements on private military companies as self-regulation. In particular, governments can 
ensure that contracts oblige private military companies to publish data on contracts and operations, 
establish direct channels of control, collaboration and communication between private contractors and 
the responsible government agencies, and increase the efficiency of private firms by clearly defining 
tasks and including penalties for non-compliance (Isenberg, 2004: 40). Moreover, contracts between 
governments and private military firms can overcome the problem of private firms evading national 
controls because companies are under direct contractual obligation to the government for which they 
are operating – whether nationally or abroad. 
 According to the theoretical framework used in the article, contracts are particularly suited for 
overcoming governance failures created by the shift from „government‟ to „governance‟ because they 
involve neither a return to the former, nor demand the full-scale adoption of norms associated with the 
latter, as does self-regulation. However, there are inherent limitations to the contractual approach to 
  
governance. In particular, it can be argued that contracts can only address normative concerns such as 
lack of transparency, accountability and public control, when governments are outsourcing military 
functions to private providers. Public accountability and transparency are not improved in contracts 
between private military firms and private businesses, which form a growing pool of [end of p.263] 
customers. In addition, practical experience from the former Yugoslavia and Iraq illustrates that 
government agencies are frequently incapable of monitoring and punishing failure to comply with the 
increasingly complex contracts for the provision of military support services in open-ended 
international interventions (GAO, 2000; GAO, 2004). Some authors even suggest that the ability of 
defence ministries to audit public-private contracts will further decline as continued military 
outsourcing reduces government expertise in these areas and creates long-term dependencies 
(Markusen, 2003: 479f.). In sum, contracts can only be an effective means of resolving normative and 
practical governance failures in government outsourcing and only if governments improve their 
capabilities of managing and monitoring long-term commercial relations with private military 
companies.  
 
Regulation 
National and international governmental regulation can apply the same standards as self-regulation or 
contracts. Unlike the latter, however, it can help to ensure public transparency, accountability, control 
and efficiency not only when governments outsource military services, but also when private military 
companies are employed by other private actors at home or abroad. Moreover, because national and 
international regulation represents a return to centralized „government‟ as a governing principle, it can 
help to resolve both the normative and practical governance failures examined above.  
As a result, national and international regulation of the private military sector has become 
increasingly popular in Europe and North America. Among the member states of the European Union, 
national regulations concerning private security services include personal security and background 
checks, increasing levels of mandatory training and requirements for the appropriate use and keeping 
of weapons (CoESS, 2004; Krahmann, 2005b). These regulations also apply to private military 
companies if they provide support services such as security for military installations within these 
countries. However, legislation specifically directed at controlling private military companies is being 
considered by countries such as the United Kingdom and Germany in order to control the export of 
private security and military services abroad (Independent, 28/11/04; CDU, 2004). 
In addition to national controls, there has been the development of similar regulations with 
regard to private military contractors operating in international interventions. In Iraq they include the 
vetting and training of personnel as well as the registration and safe storing of company weapons 
which are only to be carried with government-issued licences [end of p.264] (Isenberg, 2004: 41). 
These regulations are to be implemented either by the Iraqi Ministries of Trade and Interior for 
companies working in Iraq (CPA, 2004) or by the US Chief of Mission in the case of private 
contractors employed by the US government or the multinational forces in Iraq (USG, 2004) - the 
latter thereby setting new standards for the employment of private military contractors in international 
operations. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This article has sought to demonstrate that the rise of the private security industry in Europe and 
North America is analytically distinct from the employment of military firms in the Third World. It 
suggests that the shift from „government‟ to „security governance‟ can help to understand this 
difference in three ways. First, it puts the proliferation of private security firms in Europe and North 
America into a theoretical context. This context is very different from that of „failed‟ statehood which 
has contributed to the use of private military companies in developing countries. In the transatlantic 
region, the growth of the private security industry is part of a general transformation towards 
 „governance‟ in which policy sectors that had been centralized before and during the Cold War are 
being (re)privatised. It suggests that the new role of private military companies in Europe and North 
America is to a larger degree comparable with similar developments in policy sectors, such as 
policing, transport and health, than with the emergence of mercenary firms in developing countries 
which have never acquired these centralized capabilities.  
Second, the proposed theoretical framework explains why this development has led to a 
perceived loss of transparency, accountability, control and efficiency. It argues that these governance 
failures can be attributed to the internal tensions which emerge from the transformation from a 
centralized system of „government‟ to a fragmented system of „governance‟. Although these problems 
are widely discussed in the literature, this article helps to understand why they are considered failures 
in the first place. Moreover, by putting them within the context of „governance‟, this article highlights 
the commonalities of the problems encountered in the privatisation of military services with other 
privatised policy sectors. 
Finally, this article explains why some attempts of resolving these governance failures, 
notably self-regulation and contracts, may be considered insufficient even if their effectiveness is 
improved. It proposes that as long as popular norms in Europe and [end of p.265] North America 
require that security is accountable and controllable through the state and democratic government, 
private and market mechanisms for enhancing transparency and oversight will not meet expected 
standards. 
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1
 The following will use apostrophes for „government‟ and „governance‟ when speaking of these ideal types as 
examples of governing structures, whereas government without apostrophes will refer to national executives and 
their agencies.  
2
 Measures of de-governmentalisation have been proposed elsewhere, see for instance Klaus Dieter Wolf (2001) 
„Private Actors and the Legitimacy of Governance Beyond the State‟, paper presented at the ECPR workshop 
„Governance and Democratic Legitimacy‟, Grenoble 6-11 April, at: 
http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/jointsessions/grenoble/ papers/ws5/wolf/pdf. However, a detailed assessment of the 
degree of de-governmentalisation is beyond the scope of this article which first seeks to demonstrate the 
relevance of the governance concept for the analysis of transatlantic security.
 
3
 More recent statements argue that „[t]here is no predisposition towards either public or private sector‟ and that 
the MoD is taking a „pragmatic‟ approach. See „Public Private Partnerships in the MoD‟, at: 
http://www.mod.uk/business/ppp/intro.htm, last accessed 6 June 2004.  
 
